

DON'T BE COWED

The BBC after Hutton

GRANVILLE WILLIAMS

'AS WE now learn on the anniversary of the miners' strike that the enemy within turns out to be the BBC, had we not better privatise it sooner rather than later?' This question was addressed to the Prime Minister by Labour MP Sion Simon, on Thursday, 29 January—a day after the Hutton report was published. The tone and sentiments reveal a good deal about the rather ugly ideas and values of some New Labour MPs.

The Hutton report gives powerful support to anti-BBC forces so we should at least consider why its conclusions have provoked such astonishment and anger. Lord Hutton seemed utterly unmoved by the flow of evidence presented to him demonstrating that the essence of the Gilligan story was correct, and that some in the intelligence community were indeed worried at the use of some of their material as propaganda. Despite a blizzard of e-mails, faxes and minutes aimed at strengthening the Joint Intelligence Committee dossier, Hutton concluded Alastair Campbell's pressure on the JIC was 'subconscious' when in fact he was desperate to transform a dossier which, as a colleague said, 'Offers nothing to demonstrate any threat, let alone an imminent threat'.

The exoneration of the government's handling of Dr Kelly is also incredible. For Hutton to deny any 'underhand' conspiracy to 'out' him in the press defies the evidence Lord Hutton heard. The role of the BBC at this time, when it was being barraged by charges of anti-war bias by Alastair Campbell, was to focus on not one, but two, intelligence dossiers which were fabricated.

What Tony Blair and Alastair Campbell have done is deflect attention from those dossiers onto the BBC by implicating it in the suicide of David Kelly. They come out smelling of roses, and the BBC gets all the blame in the Hutton report.

The anti-BBC forces are gathering, with the arguments rehearsed endlessly in the Murdoch press (incidentally the same arguments used in the Thatcher years in the assault on the incumbent Director General, Alisdair Milne until he was forced to resign in January 1987): the BBC is 'institutionally left-wing', dominated by liberals, and the licence fee used to promote a partisan political agenda. Threats by government ministers and Alastair Campbell led to the departure of Gavyn Davies and then Greg Dyke, to be followed by a grovelling 'unreserved apology' by the deputy chair of BBC governors, Lord Ryder.

However an attack on the BBC may backfire badly on the government. It is all about perceptions of trust and there the BBC has more assets in the bank than the government, or indeed the Hutton report. As Greg Dyke said to BBC newsroom staff: 'Do not be cowed, be fair, but do not let anyone pressurise you.'

We need a strong, independent BBC because unlike all other media outlets, it is ultimately accountable to us, rather than billionaire owners or corporate advertisers. The likes of Murdoch or the former, unlamented owner of the Daily Telegraph skew their news to fit political agendas. It is vital in the present crisis that our views about the BBC's independence and continued future role need to be widely and clearly stated, but especially to Labour MPs like Sion Simon.

DEFEND PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING

£75,000 Target for our new campaign

BETWEEN now and the start of 2007 public service broadcasting and the BBC's Charter renewal are going to be constantly in the public eye. Many hostile to the very concept of public service broadcasting want the BBC downsized or demolished. The conclusions reached by the Hutton report will give further support to those who want to attack both the BBC's independence and journalism.

The CPBF has decided to make a campaign in support of public service broadcasting its key priority over the next couple of years. This campaign will involve publicity, meetings and lobbying of MPs. We also plan to produce a popular pamphlet outlining our arguments. Part of the £75,000 we want to raise will go towards the appointment of a campaign co-ordinator.

One job for that person will be to draw together a wide list of organisations (trade unions, the voluntary sector, educational bodies) and prominent public figures (artists, writers, broadcasters, politicians) to build a broad base of support.

Both the Ofcom and the Department of Media, Culture and Sport reviews are also engaging in extensive research and encouraging people to respond with their views and ideas on the future of public service broadcasting. That is why the CPBF wants to develop a new form of campaigning based on the American e-activism organisation, Move On. To do this we want to kick start building an e-activist list by placing adverts in newspapers urging people to get involved in our campaign to defend public service broadcasting.

We will be approaching funding bodies to get support for this campaign but we also need the money from our members and supporters too. Please do all you can to support our appeal.

The Phillis review of government communications—two perspectives

A Spin Free Regime for Blair?

NICHOLAS JONES

ALL those repeated promises by Tony Blair that his government had turned its back on spin and has stopped chasing tomorrow's headlines can finally be put to the test.

Bob Phillis and his review team have produced a blueprint for a long-term strategy which could begin to arrest the downward spiral in what they describe as a 'three-way breakdown in trust between government and politicians, the media and the general public'.

Judging by the initial response of the Cabinet Office there are some grounds for optimism but it is not clear whether the Prime Minister and his colleagues have either the will or the commitment to go as far and as fast as the Phillis Review recommends.

Evidence to Lord Hutton's inquiry into the death of the weapons inspector Dr David Kelly exposed a harsh reality. Blair's earlier undertakings, in the wake of his 2001 general election victory, were exposed as an empty gesture: Downing Street had in

fact remained addicted to spin and the manipulation of the news media.

No wonder that the government, just like the BBC, spent the months leading up to the publication of Lord Hutton's report proposing new procedures aimed at rectifying the shortcomings and mistakes of the past.

The first positive outcome from the Phillis Review was announced last September, within days of the ignominious resignation of Alastair Campbell, the Prime Minister's long-serving director of communications. An interim recommendation—that a senior civil servant should in future have strategic control over the government's publicity machine—was accepted with alacrity.

Blair had acknowledged, late in the day, that the key media post in Downing Street should never again be held by a political propagandist like Campbell.

In recommending that this should be a civil service appointment—rather than a political appointee—the review team said the new permanent secretary should become head of

profession for government information officers, provide 'strategic leadership' and establish a central unit that should become the 'centre for excellence' across government communications.

This new post was first advertised last December but interviews will not take place until the spring—an indication no doubt of the government's desire to postpone making an appointment until after ministers have had time to adjust to any fallout from the Lord Hutton's report.

If a new permanent secretary is vested with the kind of authority which has been proposed, it might herald the first tentative step towards establishing a spin-free regime in No.10. But so far there is no sign that Blair and his fellow ministers will embrace other significant recommendations.

Phillis concluded that lobby system was no longer working effectively and the review recommended that all major briefings, including the twice-daily briefings for political correspondents, should be 'held on the record, live on television and radio and with full transcripts available promptly on line'.

'Communication' should be 'redefined' to mean 'a continuous dialogue with all interested parties'. Dialogue and partnership are the preferred approaches of Trans National Corporations in their PR strategies to undermine their critics, to resist binding regulation and to further liberalise the global economy.

The report veers between the banal and the platitudinous. One example: 'more effective communication will lead to more effective government' (p12). The report has no coherent analysis of what has caused the growing gap in trust between government and governed. It reports that it has been told that this is caused by New Labour's communications strategy, the reaction of the media and the response of the civil service. This provides the opportunity for some mild criticism of government secrecy but entirely fails to understand the wide gulf between the political elite and the population, which is fostered

dismissal or resignation of almost all heads of information in 1997/98, has come full circle. The destruction of the GICS is the result—a task never managed by the Conservatives, although Michael Heseltine tried it as far back as 1979.

The report makes virtually no mention of the factors which underlie weakening of public service values in government information, not least of which is the increasing role for the private sector and PR and lobbying consultants. Of course this neglect of the underlying problem is hardly surprising given the preponderance of private sector PR people on the committee including representatives from companies touting for or already contracted to carry out government PR work.

The PR speak is visible from the first recommendation.

The end of public service information

DAVID MILLER

THE Phillis report sounds the death knell for government information as a public service. Its main recommendation is the abolition of the Government Information and Communication Service and its replacement with a permanent secretary in charge of information and strengthened communications structures within departments. Information staff will be required to identify openly with the views of the minister in preference to issuing information which is not tendentious. Or, as the report puts it, each department's communicative activity 'must clearly contribute to the achievement of the department's overall policy aims and objectives'

The revolution started by Mandelson and Campbell with the appointment of Mountfield and the

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by neo-liberal politics everywhere.

The one enlightening fact in the report is its estimate that there are 2,600 people working directly in communication directorates. This is more than twice the number that Whitehall has claimed for the past twenty years. This suggests both a phenomenal growth in government PR staff and highlights the problem that the marketisation of government information has proceeded with virtually no attention in public debate. The Phillis report will only ensure that such processes continue and government information will become even less reliable.

An Independent Review of Government Communications, Chairman Bob Phillis, Presented to the Minister for the Cabinet Office, January, 2004
<http://gcreview.gov.uk>

DIGITAL RADIO

when more means less

STEVE LAX

AN advantage of digital broadcasting over analogue is that more stations can be broadcast on the available frequencies. A typical radio listener might receive twice as many stations on a digital receiver than on analogue.

This should be good news. We could see an explosion of styles of programming, with stations serving the full range of community interests. But it doesn't seem to be working out quite like that.

Digital stations are transmitted in bundles called multiplexes. Whoever

operates the multiplex decides which stations will be carried. Under the 1996 Broadcasting Act all but one (reserved for the BBC) of the 48 local and national multiplex licences have been awarded to consortia of the five companies that already dominate UK commercial radio. So it is not surprising that the stations most commonly carried on a given multiplex are those already owned by the multiplex operating companies.

This changes the broadcasting landscape: for example, Xfm is a London-based analogue station, owned by Capital Radio. But Capital has a stake in multiplexes across the country, and Xfm is carried on those. So a local station becomes effectively national. Suddenly it's more attractive

to advertisers.

The structure of digital radio also makes it difficult for marginal voices to find a place. In analogue radio, there is at least some scope for small-scale stations: access radio, low power and restricted service licences for example. These are not to be found on digital radio—there is no commercial interest for multiplex operators in carrying small stations, and certainly no regulatory requirement.

Now the chairman of GWR is calling for the government to announce the switch-off of analogue radio. While the potential for digital radio to enhance diversity goes unrealised, and further concentration and less choice continue, that call should be rejected.

GCHQ whistleblower gagged



BARRY WHITE

KATHARINE GUN, the former GCHQ translator charged under the 1989 Official Secrets Act has been banned from saying anything to her lawyers. In effect she is unable to give instructions to her defence team. The news was broken by her counsel, Ben Emmerson QC during the short hearing at Bow Street magistrates' court on Monday 19 January where

she was committed for trial at the Old Bailey. She is accused of disclosing information about a US 'dirty tricks' operation aimed at certain security council members, alleged to have taken place before the US lead invasion of Iraq. While Katharine's defence team battle against the hidden hand of the intelligence services, high profile figures in the US have come out in her support. They include civil

rights activist Jesse Jackson, actor Sean Penn, Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers in 1971 and president of the Newspaper Guild, Linda Foley. The case is a time bomb ticking away under the government and could force Blair to release in full the legal advice given by Lord Goldsmith the Attorney General, which 'justified' going to war. Katharine Gun will appear at the Old Bailey on 16 February for a pre-trial hearing. Her case is supported by Liberty.

WITHOUT COMMENT

 A survey over the summer by the University of Maryland found that Americans who received their news from public broadcasting were much less likely than those who relied on commercial TV or the print media to believe a series of familiar myths about the war, including the notion that evidence had been found linking Iraq to al-Qaida, or that world opinion favoured the US invasion. Of those who received their news from public radio or TV, less than a quarter held these misperceptions, while almost half of those who relied on the newspapers did, as did 80% of Americans watching the major networks. 

Peter A. Hall 'Media accuracy is vital, but its freedom is even more so'
The Guardian, 17/01/04

NASTY RACIST REPORTING

'See You In May: Thousands of gypsies head for Britain' was The Sun headline on 18 January. Inside a two-page spread by Oliver Harvey used the simple fact that 1.5 million Roma who live in Poland and Slovakia will become EU citizens after 1 May and can come and work in Britain.

Of course it is impossible to predict how many Roma may come to the UK but The Sun claimed 'tens of thousands are poised to flock to Britain when the EU expands on May 1.'

The Daily Express had no qualms about predictions. Its front page on 20 January had the emotive scare headline '1.6 million gypsies ready to flood in' and a double spread accompanied by a map of Europe with the caption 'The Great Invasion 2004: Where the gypsies are coming from'.



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In the family's view, Lord Hutton should have found that the government had 'made a conscious decision to cause Dr Kelly's identity to be revealed...in order to assist it in its battle with the BBC.'

No wonder, having seen how Lord Hutton had discounted this evidence, the Kelly family's solicitor, Peter Jacobsen, repeated their heartfelt plea to ensure that the ordeal suffered by Dr Kelly 'will never be repeated' and that their 'personal tragedy is not to be compounded.'

Lord Hutton did conclude that the Ministry of Defence was at fault both for failing to inform Dr Kelly that his name would be confirmed-if suggested to the press office by journalists-and then for not having

set up a procedure to inform Dr Kelly that he would be told immediately once his name had been confirmed to the press.

While he is to be commended for criticising the government on this one and only point in the 328-page report of his findings, Lord Hutton hardly offers any comfort to Janice Kelly and her daughters. THEY clearly believed that what was to blame was a culture which had resulted in the government finding itself driven to get Dr Kelly's name 'out through the papers'.

In concluding that the government's concern about being charged with a cover up was 'justified and well founded'-and in rejecting the evidence about Downing Street's 'battle with the BBC'-Lord Hutton has not, as the government hoped, drawn a line under this affair.

Criminal negligence

The deaths of two journalists in an attack by an American tank and troops on the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad were the result of 'criminal negligence' states a Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF) report.

The shelling of the hotel from which up to 200 journalists had been working took place on 8 April 2003, and killed a Reuters cameraman, Taras Protsyuk and Jose Couso of the Spanish television station Telecinco.

According to the report the soldiers on the ground who authorised the shelling and the tank gunner who fired the shot had not been told that there were a large number of journalists in the hotel. 'The question now is whether this information was withheld deliberately, out of contempt for non-embedded journalists, or through criminal negligence,' the report says.

THIS MODERN WORLD

by TOM TOMORROW



This Tom Tomorrow cartoon appears in *Censored 2004: The Top 25 Censored Stories* produced by Peter Phillips and Project Censored (Seven Stories Press £12.99) The book is highly recommended.

Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq ed David Miller (Pluto Press £12.99)

There is no flim-flam or pseudo-academic media analysis bullshit in *Tell Me Lies*. This book is a forensic and passionate dissection of the propaganda and media distortion used to justify the war on Iraq.

David Miller from the Stirling Media Research Institute has quickly brought together short essays from over 30 media watchers and workers. These systematically demonstrate how the mainstream media regurgitated government propaganda, ignored the existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, never seriously considered the consequences of war and-with a few honourable exceptions such as Robert Fisk who is interviewed in the book-failed to address the over-riding issue in the Middle East, namely Palestine (aside from the oil).

One of the most telling contributions is from Tim Llewellyn, the BBC's Middle East correspondent for three decades. He strips apart the way the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is reported by the BBC. For Tim, the real parallel is apartheid but the way the BBC frames the issue is of two state powers

fighting each other on a level playing field. BBC executives are terrified of accusations of anti-semitism from the well-organised Israeli lobby.

This is followed by an excellent research-based study by the Glasgow Media Research Group exploring the media's role in shaping public understanding not just of the present but also of the past. This is of fundamental importance: if we don't own and control our own history we can't determine today's (his)story or change its future direction.

A further powerful contribution is from Faisal Bodi, a senior editor at Aljazeera.net and a *Guardian* columnist on Muslim affairs. Readers will appreciate the irony-in structuring its reporting-Al Jazeera practices what the BBC preaches.

'*Tell me lies*' is a breath of fresh air in media analysis. It's about changing things. It's for activists not anoraks. Miller pulls no punches: 'media activism must also be seen as part of a bigger struggle, which, in the end, involves civil disobedience. It requires millions of us to speak and act 'knowing and fearing' as John Pilger puts it, 'that we cannot be silenced'.'

MICK GOSLING

Journalism Principles and Practice by Tony Harcup (Sage, £18.99)

Did you hear the one about the off-duty reporter who spotted an ad in the local shop window offering a substantial reward for the return of a rare parrot? Turns out it wasn't lost, but stolen by an international smuggling syndicate who were abducting exotic birds to order.

Cracking front-page story. And it illustrates the notion that once upon a time there were just two schools of thought on the training of journalists. One offered apprenticeship on the coat tails of a senior hack trudging from court to council chamber; the other offered nothing: journalists could not be taught. A news-hound was born with the scent of a good story and a native grasp of the language with which to communicate it.

Since then, alongside the proliferation of meejah courses, came the proliferation of practical texts and theoretical tomes. But seldom, if ever, have the practical and the theoretical been so well assimilated as in Tony's treatment of the 'parrot' sketch.

Harcup, senior lecturer at the Centre for Journalism at Trinity and All Saints in Leeds, was himself a hack with a conscience for some 20 years, so he's well positioned to challenge those whose eyebrows rise at the juxtaposition of the words 'journalism' and 'principles'. And to bridge the 'gap of understanding that too often separates those who study media from those who produce media'.

He does so with insight and humour to rise above the temptation to cynicism in the age of 'churnalism', and explore the journalist's social role, which is more than merely reflecting reality.

Harcup's reality is illustrated by substantial contributions from contemporary working journalists, and enlightened by thoughtful reference to a wide range of theorists. The parallel analysis of the academic and the practical is facilitated by a novel, user-friendly layout, and simple but effective typographical devices.

Deliberately, there's no separate section or chapter on ethics; the ethical dimension, Harcup believes, is not to be compartmentalised but to be raised in all aspects of journalistic practice. It's a thread that runs through the entire text of this exhilarating and inspiring work.

EILEEN JONES



Who did leak the Hutton Report?

THE SUN proudly presented what turned out to be its accurate predictions on the Hutton report's conclusions. The paper's political reporter, Trevor Kavanagh, insisted that he had obtained his information by telephone from an 'impartial source'. Now the circulation of the report was strictly controlled, so who was Kavanagh's source? Consider the following circumstantial evidence. Under the Alastair Campbell spin regime *The Sun* was the recipient of New Labour exclusives, courtesy the former Director of Communications. But he said any suggestion that he was to blame for the leak was 'totally untrue and deeply offensive'. Downing Street also denied it was responsible, but among the many interesting facts revealed in the Hutton Inquiry was this one. Jonathan Powell, chief of staff in Downing Street, e-mailed Alastair Campbell, after the weapons dossier had been sexed up/modified/trans-formed (delete inappropriate words), to ask him what the headline in the *London Evening Standard*

would be on the day of publication.

When the early edition of the paper appeared a front-page banner headline answered Powell's question: '45 minutes from attack'.

We do wonder whether a similar question was asked by Downing Street about *The Sun* headline on the day of the Hutton report. Was it a case again of New Labour, Same Old Spin?

Hutton whitewash leaves Blair in dock

DAVID MILLER

THE Hutton report gave an immediate political victory to the Blair government. But the all-embracing nature of the whitewash means that a spectre is haunting the Blair government. By bracketing off the issue of the reliability of the September 2002 dossier and -not widely noticed- whether the government knew it was unreliable, he fails to put the government in the clear in the wider court of public and world opinion.

According to Campbell, Hutton shows that 'the government told the truth, the Prime Minister told the truth, I told the truth'. Similarly Blair claimed that the allegation that he had 'misled the country' is itself the 'real lie'. But Hutton did not say that the claim that the government 'probably knew' was untrue. He said it was 'unfounded' -not necessarily the same thing- and he defined his terms of reference so narrowly that questions of intelligence were ruled out. His conclusions on the claim that Iraq could launch chemical and biological weapons in 45 minutes, precisely echo Blair's attempt to spin the BBC report. 'The idea that we authorised or made our intelligence services invent' the evidence 'is absurd' said Blair on the day after the original Radio Four report. Hutton exonerates the government on the grounds the 45-minute claim was regarded by the intelligence agencies as 'reliable'.

But the allegation on the BBC was not that the intelligence on the 45 minutes claim was invented or even untrue but that it was 'sexed up'. As Gilligan himself put it on the 29 May 2003, the information 'did come from the (intelligence) agencies'. The 45 minute claim in the dossier was that Iraq 'can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles... the Iraq military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so' (p. 17). This claim involves at

least three separate falsehoods known at the time. First, that the chemical and biological agents existed and were weaponised, which the UN reports used as evidence by the government in the dossier suggested was untrue. Second, that the Iraqi's had long-range delivery mechanisms in breach of UN resolution 1441; also suggested by the UN to be untrue. Third that such weapons could be deployed in 45 minutes. The claim on 45-minutes was revealed at the Hutton inquiry by both John Scarlett of the JIC and Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6, to refer only to battle-field weapons, which was known at the time by the government. Hutton, in other words, exonerates the government of something of which they were not accused.

The wider issue this raises, is the further erosion of public trust in the mechanisms of liberal democracy leading to an ever-increasing need for the Blair government to use all possible means of deception and spin to maintain power in the face of a deeply sceptical electorate. Blair appear not to recognise the magnitude of the allegations against him, claiming that 'there could not be a more serious charge' than that of 'deception, duplicity or deceit'. But, in fact the case against Blair is not simply 'deception' but deception with the purpose of a pre-emptive attack on a third world nation already crippled by sanction resulting in up to 40,000 deaths. The allegation in other words is of war crimes in which duplicity and deception performed a key strategic role. It is this which is the spectre which will continue to haunt Blair and his government.

<http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk>

DAVID MILLER is the editor of *Tell Me Lies: Propaganda & Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq* (Pluto Press)

[HTTP://STAFF.STIR.AC.UK/DAVID.MILLER/PUBLICATIONS/TELLMELIES.HTML](http://staff.stir.ac.uk/david.miller/publications/tellmelies.html)

Why Kelly was 'outed'

NICHOLAS JONES

OF ALL the inconsistencies in Lord Hutton's report perhaps the most glaring was the way he skated over the considerable weight of evidence suggesting that Downing Street's real motive for outing Dr David Kelly was to put pressure on the BBC.

Instead of acknowledging the impact of Alastair Campbell's relentless campaign to force the BBC to make an unreserved apology, the judge reached a different conclusion.

He decided that what was driving No. 10 was the government's 'main concern that it would be charged with a serious cover up' and of concealing 'important and relevant information' from the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.

It was after accepting this argument-and in

making no further mention of the forces unleashed by No. 10's dispute with the BBC-that Lord Hutton found there was nothing to suggest that there was 'a strategy to leak Dr Kelly's name covertly' and that there were no grounds to criticise the government for 'underhand or dishonourable or duplicitous conduct.'

LORD HUTTON said one of the issues he had to address was whether the government devised and implemented an underhand strategy to name Dr Kelly-'whereby his name was deliberately leaked to the press without the government appearing to do so'-in order to strengthen its case in 'its battle with the BBC.'

For a time, at the start of the inquiry, it appeared to him that a case of 'some strength' could be made that there was such a strategy. 'However, as the Inquiry proceeded and I heard more evidence about the surrounding circumstances and the considerations which influenced those in government, I came to the conclusion that the reality was that there was no such underhand strategy.'

He had considered what might happen if the government had not issued a statement that a civil servant had come forward and volunteered that he had met Andrew Gilligan. If that information had leaked out later; and it was 'very probable it would have done', then the government would have faced 'a serious charge of a cover up and of attempting to conceal an important piece of information.'

LORD HUTTON did acknowledge the answers that Campbell gave in his evidence: that it would assist the government in showing that Gilligan's reports were 'unworthy of belief' if Dr Kelly's name 'came into the public domain.'

But the judge then concluded that it was not for him 'to resolve some differences and areas of uncertainty' in the evidence of Campbell and the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon. Hoon felt it would 'not be fair' to name Dr Kelly unless 'there was certainty that he was Gilligan's source'. Furthermore the Prime Minister did not accept that Dr Kelly's name should be 'deliberately put into the public domain by the government.'

After this explanation about the differences between the evidence of Campbell, Hoon and Blair, Lord Hutton made no further mention of the potential impact of Campbell's pursuit of the BBC. In reaching his decisions the judge returned repeatedly to his conclusion that the overriding factor that led to the process of naming Dr Kelly was the government's fear that it might be accused on a cover up.

In addition, the level of media interest was so intense, Dr Kelly's name was bound to become known and it was 'not a practical possibility to keep his name secret.'

AFTER reading Lord Hutton's report to see whether he had been even handed when

reaching his conclusions about the conduct of both the government and the BBC, I was struck by Lord Hutton's reluctance to apply his test of 'dishonourable, underhand or duplicitous' to the intentions which were enunciated so vividly in the Campbell's personal diary.

In setting out his conclusions, Lord Hutton made no reference to the relevant diary entries which charted each step Campbell had taken. What I thought was equally significant was that in the published extracts of his diary, Campbell made no mention of the fear of a cover up being the government's 'main concern', yet Lord Hutton concluded this was the dominant factor.

What the diary showed was that Campbell remained pre-occupied throughout this period by his dispute with the BBC and the need to 'get it out through the papers' that a source had come forward:

July 4 2003: 'GH and I agreed it would fuck Gilligan if that was his source.'

July 6 2003: 'GH, like me, wanted to get it out that the source had broken cover.'

July 7 2003: 'Several chats with MOD, Pam Teare, then Geoff H re the source. Felt we should get it out through the papers.'

If these diary entries did not indicate an 'underhand, dishonourable or duplicitous' intent, Lord Hutton might have referred to the evidence of Godric Smith, one of the Prime Minister's two official spokesmen.

At 6pm on 7 July Smith said he was in Campbell's office in Downing Street when Campbell, who was talking to Hoon, switched the conversation to a speakerphone.

'Alastair floated the idea that the news that an individual had come forward, who could be the possible source, be given that evening to one paper.' A little later, after discussing what he had heard with his colleague Tom Kelly, Smith telephoned Campbell to tell him that they both considered this was 'a bad idea.' Hoon said in his evidence that he 'did not agree to that approach' and Campbell said nothing came of it because the Prime Minister also thought 'it was a bad idea.'

Nevertheless the action Campbell was contemplating hardly appeared honourable: it was obvious that a potential trade off with an unidentified journalist had been in the offing and that in all likelihood the eventual currency for this deal would have been the name 'Kelly.' Lord Hutton and his team failed to ascertain the likely recipient of this hot tip from the Prime Minister's director of communications.

THIS insight into Campbell's mindset figured prominently in the Kelly family's final and previously unpublished written submission. They appealed to Lord Hutton to pay close attention to the diary entries which indicated that 'the biggest thing needed was the source out.'

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CPBF NEWS

PUBLIC MEETING

Post-Hutton and a year after the massive 15 February anti-war march, a timely public meeting on media reporting, distortion and propaganda

Tell Me Lies: Media & Propaganda in the Iraq War

7.30pm Thursday 12 February
West Yorkshire Playhouse, Leeds

Speakers

STEPHEN DORRIL

Author of *MI6: 50 Years of
Special Operations.*

PAUL ROGERS

Professor of Peace Studies,
Bradford University.

GRANVILLE WILLIAMS

Organised by Leeds NUJ and CPBF.

CONFERENCE

Media Bias & the 'Propaganda Model'

9.30-5.00 28 February
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